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CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN
BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH
David Blumenthalt
I HAVE BEEN DOING RESEARCH on academic and
industry relationships for about 20 years. I got into it when I
was a young faculty member at the Kennedy School of Gov-
ernment at the time. I was still actively seeing patients at Mas-
sachusetts General Hospital, which concluded an agreement
with the Hoechst AG Company to do a long-term research col-
laboration, including setting up a whole new Department of Ge-
netics, which in those days was pretty farsighted.
After this agreement was announced, a little known Con-
gressman, who chaired a government oversight subcommittee of
the House Commerce Committee, invited the president of Mass.
General down to talk about this new relationship, because he
was concerned that we were selling our birthright, our scientific
birthright, to the Germans. I was interested in what, in fact,
these kinds of relationships meant. That began what subse-
quently became a twenty-year course of investigation. That
Congressman was Al Gore. So, I like to attribute my interest in
this topic to Al Gore.
I would like to talk about the role of the university in bio-
technology Research & Development. I will review the topic
broadly and get to conflicts of interest later on. I guess there are
four R's in my agenda. First of all, I am going to go briefly
through the reason for these relationships. Then I am going to
talk a little bit about the record and what, in fact, has transpired
and what the consequences of these relationships have been for
both of the parties-universities and industries. Then I would
like to talk about the rub-the problems-especially conflict of
interest as a problem, and how we might approach those con-
flicts from the standpoint of resolving them.
We have heard of the Bayh-Dole Act; we have heard about
public support of research and expectation of return as reasons
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for the involvement of universities and industries. I think that
some of these rationales often go unstated, but they are worth
recalling, especially when we get into the pros and cons of some
of these relationships.
I like Abraham Lincoln's quote that the reason for intellec-
tual property law was to add the fuel of greed to the fire of gen-
ius. That gets right at the bargain that we are making with intel-
lectual property law and the university-industry interaction.
We should recall that this process does have its basis, to
some degree, in changing norms in the university. These kinds
of relationships were not always sanctioned and there are, of
course, changing norms of all kinds prevalent in the medical
profession generally, which come into play when you start talk-
ing about clinical research. One has to start thinking more
broadly about the norms that underlie professionalism generally
when discussing academic-industry relationships..
In terms of the record concerning academic-industry rela-
tionships (AIRs), including their prevalence and magnitude, I
would like to talk just very briefly about the data sources upon
which I base my discussion.
I have been in this work a long time now. We have done,
over the last twenty years, four national surveys of life science
faculty, conducted at various times with various emphases,
starting in the mid-1980s. We just came out of the field with the
last survey that was done in the 1999-2000 period.
Over this period we have also done two surveys of industry
executives on their relationships with universities, one in 1985,
one in 1995. We actually did a survey of students and trainees
on their relationships with industries in the mid-1980s. I will be
sharing with you information from several of these sources.
There is a common assumption and perception that the
number of academic-industry relationships has exploded and
that every other faculty member today and probably tomorrow,
every faculty member, will have a deal with a company. Our
data does not support this impression.
We have looked at the prevalence of faculty members' re-
ceipt of industry funding at four different points in time over the
last two decades. Basically, we find the prevalence has not
changed much. Somewhere between twenty-one and twenty-
eight percent of faculty, depending on how you define the term
"faculty member," have research support from industry.
[Vol. 12:377
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In the mid-1980s, about twenty percent of students had
some research relationship with a company, if you included the
support of scholarships and fellowships from industrial sources.
The other thing that has not changed much is the preva-
lence of faculty members holding equity in related companies.
Equity holding is a particularly sensitive topic. We found that in
the mid-1980s, about seven to eight percent of faculty reported
that they held equity in a company related to their research; and
in our 1999-2000 study, we have found basically the same
thing: about seven to eight percent of faculty report that they
have equity in a related company.
About half of faculty act as consultants for a company. So,
these relationships are prevalent, but they are not exploding, at
least not based on the data that we have collected.
There is some variation in rates of industrial involvement
among faculty of different types. For example, clinical faculty
tend to report higher rates of relationships than non-clinical.
The 1995 survey shows about twenty-eight percent of faculty
reported that they got support from industry for their research,
but the number for clinical faculty was a little more than a third,
while for non-clinical faculty it was about twenty-one percent.
2002]
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Clinical-non-clinical distinctions are critically important in
talking about conflict of interest.
Again, the impression is that industry research is ubiquitous
and that industry funding is a major source of support. If you
look at the numbers as reported by faculty concerning the pro-
portion of their budgets derived from industry, one finds that
the numbers are modest: about nine percent of direct costs of
research, on average, across the major research institutions in
the United States, twelve percent for clinical faculty, and six
percent for non-clinical faculty.
Industrial research relationships with universities also tend
to be small. We hear in the newspaper about megarelationships,
about multi-million dollar, multi-year arrangements that raise
concerns about the university being bought lock stock and bar-
rel. But, in fact, for most faculty members, relationships are
small and, as we will see, they are short-term.
According to 1995 data, only about six percent of relation-
ships were in excess of $500,000 a year, seventy-one percent
were less than $100,000 a year. We estimated from this data in
the mid-1990s that at that time about ten to fifteen percent of
total university funding for life sciences research and develop-
ment came from industrial sources as opposed to perhaps sev-
[Vol. 12:377
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enty to eighty percent from public sources, like the National
Institutes of Health.
Most relationships are short. The great majority are less
than two years in duration and only a tiny minority are more
than three years in duration. So technology transfer officers are
all in pursuit of the big long deal, but the big long deal is a rare
event.
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Let us talk about some of the commercial benefits. In the
mid-1980s, we surveyed industry executives and asked them
what they had gotten from their dealings with universities, es-
pecially their research support universities. Close to two-thirds,
over sixty percent, had gotten some return from their investment
in the form of patents, actual products, or products that had
sales. So, there was something coming in concretely in return
for their relationships with universities.
[Vol. 12:377
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We have data comparing faculty who have support from
industry for their research with faculty who do not have support
from industry, in terms of some measures of commercial pro-
ductivity. Not surprisingly, people who get industry support are
more likely to report that they have patented, that they have a
product on the market, or that they have a start-up company.
Whether this relationship is in any way causal, we cannot tell
from our data, but it seems reasonable to believe that there is a
tendency for people with industry money to focus a little bit
more on the commercial results of their work than those who do
not have industry money.
383
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Based on mid-1990s data, we attempted to look at the pro-
ductivity of research at universities and other sites based on
patents, sales, and products resulting from that research. Just to
summarize, we found that the return on investment in academic
institutions was at least as high or higher than on investments in
research in other sites. Investing in universities did not seem to
be something that companies had to apologize for doing.
[Vol. 12:377
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There are also more highly visible and intuitive benefits,
such as the Silicon Valley, Route 128, and the Research Trian-
gle Park phenomena
Based on studies by the National Bureau of Economic Re-
search, we know that academics participated in founding
twenty-four Fortune 500 companies and over 600 non-Fortune
500 life science firms during the 1980s and early 1990s. These
numbers are probably higher now.
And there also are studies showing that if you quantify the
number of star scientists (these are scientists that in the life sci-
ences have extraordinary records of productivity in publishing
and grant getting) and then correlate that with the presence of
new biotechnology entities-new biotechnology start-up com-
panies-there is a relationship between the academic bench
strength in a region and the number of new companies in that
region.
We published data in the mid-1990s based on a mid-1990
survey that looked at the productivity of academics in their own
coin of the realm: their rates of publication in terms of their
level of industrial research support. The faculty members who
produced the fewest number of publications in the three years
prior to the time that we queried them were those who had no
industry support; and that those with moderate amounts of in-
385
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dustry support tended to be the most productive faculty mem-
bers as judged by rates of publication in peer review journals.
influence of the publications by faculty with more than two-
thirds of their support from industry, we found that they pub-
lished in less influential journals than their peers, including
their peers who had no industry support.
So, there may be an effect or at least a relationship between
quality of publication and the extent of involvement in aca-
demic-industry relationships. But there is no adverse effect on
the numbers of publications.
There are some other effects, though, that in academic en-
vironments we need to be attentive to. One of them is data
withholding, which is our euphemism for secrecy. When we
asked companies in the mid-1990s about whether they required,
as a part of their agreements with the universities, some secrecy
or withholding of data that went beyond what we might think of
as the normal pre-patent review, many will admit that they do.
Forty-seven percent said that their agreements sometimes
require withholding of data beyond the time required to file a
patent and fifty-six percent of those said that this agreement had
386 [Vol. 12:377
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actually been implemented at some point. That is, they have ac-
tually insisted on data being withheld beyond the time required
to patent the finding.
If you look at faculty members' behavior as reported in our
surveys, you will also find a difference in their reported data
withholding behaviors depending on whether they have industry
support, or whether they are involved in commercializing their
own research.
Faculty members are more likely to say that they delayed
publications for more than six months in order to honor an in-
dustrial request if they have industry support for their research
than if they do not. They are also more likely to say, by a sub-
stantial margin, that trade secrets have resulted from their re-
search. We define trade secrets as information kept secret to
protect its proprietary value. The same pattern is observed
among faculty who report engaging in commercialization of re-
search results, independent of whether they had research sup-
port from industry.
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Now, what does it mean when people withhold data? That
is one of the questions we got interested in. We were recently
funded by the National Human Genome Research Institute to
look at precisely this question for geneticists and other life sci-
entists.
We asked geneticists in particular what the consequences
were when they were denied access to requested data from an
investigator who had published his research findings. Among
the reported consequences were: ability by requesting scientist
to confirm published results (twenty-eight percent); delay in
their own publications (twenty-four percent); and a series of
other effects.
Academic-industry interactions are not the only reason why
data is withheld. When you ask people why they withheld data,
you find that there are other reasons that are much more impor-
tant than a commercial relationship. A lot of people just say it
was too much effort.
Other people will say they were protecting their ability to
publish their next paper or were protecting one of the junior col-
leagues. Forty-four percent cite the financial costs. Twenty-
seven percent say that they were honoring, or thought they were
honoring, an industry requirement; about twenty-one percent
say that they were preserving the commercial value of their
work.
[Vol. 12:377
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The faculty members who have relationships with indus-
tries are more likely to direct their research consciously in a
commercial direction. That should not surprise anybody. I guess
that is the reason why we promote these relationships: to tap the
university intellects for commercial purposes. Nevertheless,
there is a possible change in the direction of research.
One thing we need to be aware of when we enter the clini-
cal realm is the evidence that has accumulated of bias in clinical
research reporting associated with industry support. There is
accumulating evidence that clinical studies supported by indus-
try or conducted by scientists with financial relationships are
more likely to favor industrial interests.
A study by Stelfox and colleagues in the New England
Journal of Medicine in 1998 found that ninety-six percent of
those who published reviews supportive of calcium channel
blockers in the treatment of hypertension had a relationship
with the manufacturer that made calcium channel blockers, as
opposed to thirty-seven percent of those who published critical
articles.
Ninety-nine percent of industry trials of nonsteroidal anti-
inflammatory agents found that those agents were equal to or
superior to competing drugs. That is probably above the random
chance. Five percent of industry sponsored trials reported unfa-
vorable findings for cancer drugs compared to thirty-eight per-
cent of non-industry supported trials.
There is the question of whether industry relationships can
involve threats to patients. The most celebrated case of this was
the Gelsinger case, a gene therapy trial at the University of
Pennsylvania in 1999. There was a series of interlocking rela-
tionships between the investigators and a company in which
they held equity and in which the University held equity. This
led to a cascading series of public involvements in rethinking
the conflict of interest rules that pertain to publicly funded re-
search. It is not yet resolved, I would point out.
Now, I do not know of any definitive evidence that a con-
flict of interest has ever directly injured a patient, but the
Gelsinger case and a number of others have certainly created
the suspicion or appearance of that eventuality.
There are situations of complex overlapping conflicts of in-
terest in academic clinical research that are certainly public.
Perhaps the best example of that is Boston University, in which
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the president of the University and the investigator doing the
clinical research all held equity in the start-up company that the
university had partly funded.
So what is the rub? I have begun to hint at it already. One
of the rubs is conflict of interest. There are a series of rubs, but
I think they can be collected under this general concept of con-
flict of interest.
A conflict of interest occurs when two interests collide;
pretty straight forward. Interests are things of value to some-
body or something. Usually it means that pursuit of one interest
detracts or has the potential to detract from the other interest;
otherwise there would not be a real conflict. Now, sometimes
we can manage our way out of conflicts. And when we talk
about managing conflicts of interest, it is usually with that in
mind, the hope that some clever device can be created that will
reduce the possibility of conflict to such a low level that it be-
comes unimportant.
The Institutional Review Board mechanism was designed
and has functioned to balance the conflict of interest between
the investigator and his or her research subject, and correctly or
incorrectly, was perceived to have mitigated this conflict until
recently.
Not all conflicts can be managed that effectively, of course.
In beginning to think about choices, we need to recognize that
not all interests are equal. In effect, we, in our daily work and
thinking are always creating hierarchies of interest; some inter-
ests trump other interests. We assign them a rank in making de-
cisions among them. These are some of the tradeoffs that we are
implicitly weighing when we consider the conflicts of interest
created by academic-industry interactions.
One notable conflict pits the interest of science in some
large sense against the interests of a researcher. And the conflict
that we are battling there is whether the financial interest of the
researcher might hurt the progress of science, the scientific en-
terprise, because of concerns about bias or secrecy or dimin-
ished quality of research.
Another set of conflicts that we are always managing is the
interests of patients versus the interests of researchers. This is
uniquely true in research that involves living human subjects.
There we are concerned with whether the financial interests of
390 [Vol. 12:377
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researchers may cause or appear to cause harm to patients. This
really becomes an issue of patient protection.
I have often had disagreements with some of my research
colleagues over what was at stake over managing conflicts of
interest. They want to focus on the bias issues and I think that in
many ways the critical issue is patient protection.
Still another conflict pits the interest of research faculty
against their students and post-doctoral trainees. Recently, the
Harvard community just created a new regulation that provides
students a way of finding impartial review of their situations
outside of their own laboratories if they were concerned that
their professor's financial interest may be compromising their
educational experience.
All of these might be less troubling if it were not for the
fact that we have a collective interest in commercializing re-
search because of its benefits to the economy and public health.
So, in some way the public health and the economy are weighed
against, or could at times be in conflict with, the interests of pa-
tients, science, researchers, and students-at least potentially.
Now, what should we do about all of this? My own view,
and the one I think increasingly accepted in the scientific com-
munity, is that conflicts of interest, real or apparent, that
threaten patient well-being are not acceptable. Therefore, con-
flicts of interest that directly affect patients in clinical trials
need to be carefully regulated and perhaps prohibited.
Conflicts of interest that may cause damage to science in
some generic sense are much more difficult to assess and I think
need to be weighed against all of the harms and benefits that
result from these relationships.
Since I am a researcher, I want to call for more research on
this topic, exploring the benefits and risks. I do not think we
fully understand them at this point. We also need to explore the
effects of alternative policy interventions in managing conflicts
of interest.
I think there is a rationale for prohibition of one type of
conflict of interest, and that is financial conflict of interest in-
volving research on living human subjects. I also think that it is
probably appropriate to ban certain collections of conflicts of
interest because they distract the university from any effective
supervision of its faculty. Those are the kind I mentioned with
respect to Boston University, in which the web of institutional
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interests is so dense that it is not clear who is supervising the
interests of the university.
But for the management of other kinds of relationships, I
think that we can agree that disclosure of all relationships, in-
cluding institutional equity, is necessary, and that there may be
a role for certain kinds of limitations in gains; for example,
those associated with the sale of equity in companies supporting
faculty research.
This is an area of continuing interest. I hope that it is one
where we will continue to be sensitive, not only to the benefits
of academic-industry interactions, but also to their harms. I
think that in the long-term, it is in the best interests of all parties
involved.
